Introduction
Until the 1990s, most infrastructure utilities were self regulated or under the control of a Ministry, with tariffs, employment, and quality of service reflecting political concerns rather than the efficiency and financial sustainability of service delivery. In this context, the main objectives of the reforms of the 1990s were to reduce political interference with the operation of utilities and to increase firm efficiency. 1 The creation of independent regulators was central to an effort that in many cases also involved some kind of private involvement in the operation.
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In this paper we investigate the average causal effect of regulatory agencies on firm performance and welfare in developing countries. The identification of the causal effect of a regulatory agency on performance and welfare is difficult since governments choose whether to introduce a regulatory agency and that choice may be correlated to unobservable factors that also affect performance and welfare. Our identification strategy exploits the observed variation across time and space in the introduction of regulatory agencies to estimate this causal effect. We also take advantage from the observed variation in the sequencing of the reform process to disentangle the impact of establishing a regulatory agency from the impact of private participation in a context in which increased private participation has been quite significant.
We document the impact of establishing a regulatory agency on six general areas-labor productivity, efficiency in operating and maintenance expenses, energy losses, service coverage, frequency of interruptions, and tariffs. We first focus on the 1 As documented in Megginson and Netter (2001) , the goals of privatization programs around the world were to raise revenue for the state, promote economic efficiency, reduce government interference in the economy, promote wider share ownership, provide the opportunity to introduce competition, and expose state-owned enterprises to market discipline. 2 For example, the proportion of countries with an independent regulatory agency in the electricity sector increased from 4% in 1990 to 54% in 2004, while the proportion of countries with some kind of impact of regulatory agencies on firm efficiency as approximated by a labor requirement function. Our results indicate that regulatory agencies are associated with more efficient firms. We find similar results when we analyze firm performance in terms of partial indicators such as workers per connection, operating expenditures, and energy losses. We then check if these improvements on the supply side are translated into improvements in the service received by the users. Our results indicate that the establishment of a regulatory agency is associated with higher social welfare, as measured by service coverage, frequency of interruptions, and residential tariffs.
There is a related literature to our paper on the impact of privatization and reforms on the performance of individual operators. 3 Gassner, Popov, and Pushak (2006) evaluate the connection between reforms and firm performance in developing countries. Estache and Rossi (2005) study the impact of regulatory regimes on utility performance. Zhang, Parker, and Kirkpatrick (2005) analyze the sequencing of reforms in the electricity generation sector in developing countries. Our work is also related to the literature on the impact of regulatory agencies on the odds of renegotiation (Guasch, 2004) and on the development of financial markets (Glaeser, Johnson, and Shleifer, 2001) .
The plan for the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the dataset. Section 3 presents the econometric model. Section 4 shows the empirical results and provides evidence of their robustness. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
Data
We exploit an unbalanced panel that comprises firm-level information on a representative sample of 220 electric utilities from 51 development countries for the private involvement in the operation of electric utilities in the same period increased from 4% to 37% (Estache and Goicoechea, 2005) . 3 See Kikeri, Nellis, and Shirley (1994) and Megginson and Netter (2001) for surveys of privatization programs around the world.
period 1985 to 2005. 4 The data were provided by the World Bank, and it were collected from several sources, including regulators, governmental agencies, and firms' balance sheets.
The variables measuring the reforms are a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm is under the control of a regulatory agency (for more than six months) and a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm received private participation (for more than six months).
Although measuring the introduction of a regulatory agency by means of a single dummy variable may seem to be a highly aggregated vision of what happens in regulation, it is not unreasonable for developing countries to assume that simply creating a separate institution responsible for the implementation of the regulatory commitments of the state was a major achievement. However skilled or politically independent these new regulators were, all their actions became all of a sudden much more transparent and this is an immense change in terms of the ability of users to reduce the risks of capture or at least to increase its costs and in terms of the ability of operators to demonstrate the interference of politicians with the day to day operations of their business.
We define private participation as a situation where the private operator has control over the operation of the utility. 4 The sample covers the following countries: Argentina (22 firms supplying electricity to approximately 75% of the total number of customers in the country), Azerbaijan (5, 100%), Belize (1, 100%), Bolivia (7, 88%), Botswana (1, 100%), Brazil (57, 99%) , Burkina Faso (1, 100%), Cameroon (1, 100%), Cape Verde (1, 100%), Central African Republic (1, 100%), Colombia (11, 74%) Summary statistics are presented in Table 1 .
Methodology
The objective is to identify the impact of introducing a regulatory agency on firm performance and social welfare in the electricity sector in countries. Our empirical analysis takes advantage of the fact that in the past two decades not all developing countries introduced regulatory agencies in their electricity sectors and that those countries that introduced regulatory agencies did it at different moments of time, thus providing variation across time and space that we propose to use in order to identify the causal effect of the introduction of regulatory agencies on firm performance and social welfare. We also exploit the observed variation in the sequencing of the reform process to disentangle the impact of establishing a regulatory agency from the impact of private participation.
The sequencing of the reforms for the countries included in our sample is summarized in Table 2 . There are 38 firms (operating in 11 countries) for which private participation arrived before the creation of the regulatory agency, 54 firms (in 17 countries) for which the regulatory agency was in place before private participation, and only 17 firms (in four countries) for which private sector participation arrived during the same year in which the regulatory agency was established.
A methodological concern in this type of study is that governments choose whether to introduce a regulatory agency and that choice may be correlated to unobservable factors that also affect performance and welfare. A common method of controlling for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity is to use panel data and to estimate a difference-in-differences model. Formally, the difference-in-differences model may be specified as
where it Y is the natural logarithm of the output of interest (labor, operating expenditures, service coverage, quality of service, energy losses, or tariffs) for firm i in period t, it X is a set of regressors, it D is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if firm i operates under the control of a regulatory agency during period t, i α is a time-invariant firm effect, t μ is a time effect common to all firms in period t, and it ε is a firm time-varying error distributed independently across firms and time and independently of all i α and t μ . The parameter of interest, β , is the difference-indifferences estimate of the average effect of introducing a regulatory agency on the output of interest.
Results
Our first set of estimations focuses on firm efficiency. As observed by Kumbhakar and Hjalmarsson (1998) productivity in distribution is, to a large extent, driven by management and efficient labor use; accordingly, the concept of efficiency used through this study is labor-use efficiency (labor productivity): a firm is inefficient if it uses more labor to produce a given bundle of outputs than an otherwise efficient firm would. Our goal, then, is to explain the determinants of labor use, including a variety of technological factors, the characteristics of service, the presence of a regulatory agency, and a set of controls.
Our model for firm efficiency includes a variable input (the number of employees), a capital input (the kilometers of distribution network), and two outputs (the total number of connections and the total energy supplied to final customers). In many applications service area is included as an output in the econometric model.
Being constant over time, in our model service area is captured by the individual effect.
The number of employees is our measure of labor input. The only capital input in our model is the length of the electricity network in kilometers. As noted by Neuberg (1977) and Kumbakhar and Hjalmarsson (1998) distributors have limited control over the length of distribution lines, since the amount of capital embodied in the network reflects geographical dispersion of customers rather than differences in productive efficiency. Therefore, we treat distribution lines as a capital variable representing the characteristics of the network.
The electricity technology is represented by means of a labor requirement function. We use a translog functional form because it provides a second-order approximation to a broad class of functions. The translog labor requirement function may be specified as
where 1 2 3
, X , X , and X Y are the natural logarithms of labor, sales, connections, and distribution lines.
We expect regulatory agencies to have a positive impact on labor productivity for both public operators and private operators ( ) 0 β < . Public operators may be thought as having the objective of delivering energy subject to a constraint of minimum employment and maximum price. In practice, there has been little accountability for the outcomes associated to this optimization program simply because self regulation or regulation by the political process allowed public operators to avoid this accountability. By getting an independent monitoring of the performance of operators, the creation of a regulatory agency increases the accountability for the quality and quantity of service, reducing the scope for inefficient employment levels.
Thus, the creation of a regulatory agency allows public operators to run employment decisions much more in line with a profit maximizing criteria, leading to a reduction in labor requirements.
The underlying story is different for private operators. The idea of non-regulated monopolists being inefficient has been there for a while. For instance, Hicks (1935) argues that the best of all monopoly profits is a quiet life. In the same vein, Hart (1983) suggests that the lack of relevant benchmarks for comparing managerial performance in monopoly markets may be the cause of managerial slack. If this were the case, the introduction of a regulator would push private operators to minimize costs and hence to reduce employment.
Ordinary Least Squares estimates of Equation (2) are reported in Table 4 . In order to address the potential problem of serial correlation we report standard errors clustered at the firm level.
As usual for translog function approximations, the outputs and the capital input have been mean corrected; therefore, the first-order coefficients are elasticities evaluated at the sample mean. The first-order output coefficients are statistically significant and have the expected signs regarding economic behavior: an increase in outputs is associated with an increase in the use of labor. The time dummies are statistically significant in all models and imply an average rate of labor productivity growth in the sector of about 3.5% per year. Overall, estimates regarding technological parameters are in line with the specialized literature on electricity distribution, yielding further confidence to the validity of the estimation strategy.
The first column of Table 4 reports the labor-requirement difference-indifferences model without controls, apart from firm fixed effects and year dummies.
The coefficient on the regulatory agency dummy variable is negative and statistically significant. The coefficient is also significant in economic terms: firms operating under the control of a regulatory agency use about 9.5% less labor to produce a given bundle of outputs.
Our use of energy sold as a measure of output might bias our estimates if the presence of a regulatory agency is correlated with energy losses. As pointed out by Bagdadioglu et al. (1996) , network losses reflect the quality of the network system in terms of how much power is lost in the transformers and during distribution, and how much power is uncounted due to other reasons, such as illegal use. Technical losses are related to the square of the distance transmitted, and hence our econometric model captures them. Our main concern is related to non-technical losses associated to illegal use. In order to address the problem of whether including network losses have any impact on the estimated coefficients we replace "sales" by "sales + energy losses". As shown in Column (2), the coefficient on regulatory agency is still significantly associated to lower labor requirements.
Ownership type is an important control since privatization may have an impact on outcomes and add a confounding effect when it accompanies the establishment of a regulatory agency. In order to control for ownership type, in Column (3) we include an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the firm is privately owned and zero otherwise. The negative and statistically significant association between the private dummy variable and labor efficiency suggests that private firms outperform public firms. The negative and significant association between the regulatory agency dummy variable and labor persists, though the coefficient is smaller than the one obtained in the model without controlling for private ownership. The magnitude of the estimated coefficients suggests that private participation has more impact on labor requirements than the establishment of a regulatory agency.
To further explore the effects of the reform process we interact the regulatory agency dummy with the private dummy. As shown in Column (4) the interaction effect is not significant, suggesting that there is no differential impact of regulatory agencies on labor efficiency according to ownership type.
In Column (5) we include the proportion of residential connections as an environmental variable that should capture the effect of delivering energy to different type of customers. The proportion of residential connections is not significant and it appears not to have any impact on the sign or significance of other coefficients. In particular, regulatory agency remains negatively associated with labor efficiency.
As suggested by Dal Bó and Rossi (2007), corruption may divert managerial effort away from the productive process, and the way for firms to meet their service obligations is to use more inputs. Additionally, a regulatory agency might have a different impact according to the country's level of corruption. Thus, in Column (6) we include country-level corruption and its interaction with regulatory agency as additional controls. 5 In this specification the coefficient of corruption is negative and significant, indicating that more corruption in the country is associated with more labor-inefficient firms. The coefficient on the interaction is not significant, suggesting that there is no differential impact of regulatory agencies according to the country's level of corruption. Again, regulatory agency remains strongly associated with lower labor requirements.
Even after controlling for corruption, a concern is that there may be other country characteristics that are correlated with both labor-efficiency and the presence of a regulatory agency. To address this concern we control for a number of observed country-level time-varying characteristics, such as GDP per capita, population density, and quality of the bureaucracy. 6 The coefficients on these country-level controls are individually and jointly not significant. The sign, magnitude, and significance of the coefficients of interest remain unaltered.
7
An important source of bias in the difference-in difference approach could arise when treated and control firms are not comparable. We deal with this potential problem of comparing the incomparable by applying the difference-in-differences approach to the support common to treated firms and control firms (defined as the sub-sample obtained by deleting all observations of control firms with an estimated propensity score lower than the minimum one of the treated group and all observations of treated firms with an estimated propensity score higher than the maximum one of the control group). We estimate the propensity score from a Probit model of the probability of the introduction of a regulatory agency at some point during the sample window as a function of a set of average pre-treatment characteristics, such as GDP per capita, quality of the bureaucracy, IMF agreement, 6 For quality of the bureaucracy we use the Bureaucracy Quality Index produced by International Country Risk Guide, which ranges between four (high quality) and zero (low quality). Population and GDP per capita (in US dollars) were obtained from the World Bank database. 7 Results mentioned but not reported are available from the authors upon request. and electricity losses. 8 All explanatory variables in the estimated Probit model (not reported) are statistically significant, and the balancing property is satisfied. In alternative specifications we tried including other firm-level characteristics, such as labor productivity and service coverage, but they were not significant. As shown in Table 5 , results corresponding to the difference-in-differences approach applied to the common support are consistent with previous results.
To further validate our results we perform additional estimations under a wide range of alternative specifications and samples. The value and significance of the coefficients of interest remain unchanged when we drop one firm at the time or one country at the time, when we estimate a Cobb-Douglas instead of a translog labor requirement function, and when the variables are included in levels rather than in logs. Conclusions in terms of the significance of the coefficients remain also unchanged when standard errors are clustered at country-year combinations.
Other measures of firm performance and social welfare Table 6 reports estimates of the impact of regulatory agencies on three measures of firm efficiency (labor per connection, operating expenditures per connection, and electricity losses) and three measures of social welfare (service coverage, frequency of interruptions, and average residential tariffs).
Labor per connection is a weaker measure of labor efficiency than the one obtained from the labor requirement model, but it has the advantage of allowing us to increase the number of firms and countries in the sample compared to the labor requirement specification. Difference-in-differences estimates for the labor per connection specification confirms the labor requirement results: regulatory agencies have a positive impact on labor productivity and private firms outperform public ones in terms of labor productivity. As in the labor requirement case, the impact from private participation is more important than the impact from the presence of regulatory agencies. Again, there are no effects arising from the interaction between regulatory agencies and ownership.
We then consider operating expenditures as a performance indicator. Using operating expenses has the advantage of including expenditures for work contracted outside the firm, thus making the measure of variable inputs more comparable between firms with different levels of horizontal integration. Results for operating expenditures per connection suggest that regulatory agencies have a positive impact on firm efficiency, in the sense that they incur in lower operating expenditures. Again, there is no differential impact of regulatory agencies according to ownership type.
And there is no reason to expect a major change for the sample period covered here.
The agencies, before there is time for operators to capture them, will initially handle their responsibilities the same way with public and private operators, one of the expected benefits of increased accountability for the civil servants responsible for regulation in developing countries.
Our third measure of firm efficiency is the electricity that is lost in the distribution process. As shown in Column (3) of Table 6 , the coefficients for ownership and regulatory agency are not significant in the equation for the electricity that is lost for technical and non-technical reasons. Energy losses, however, tend to be lower for private firms operating under the control of a regulatory agency.
So far, the partial performance indicators have focused on the supply side of the business. From the point of view of users, other dimensions are much more important.
We have information of three such dimensions: quality of service, access to the service as measured by the coverage rate, and average residential tariff (that gives a sense of the affordability of the service provided).
Column (4) reports results for quality of service, as measured by the frequency of interruption of the electricity service. The presence of a regulatory agency is strongly associated with a decrease in the frequency of interruption, and this association is similar for private and public firms. The coefficient on the private dummy variable is not significant in this specification.
As reported in Column (5), there is a positive association between regulatory agencies and service coverage. Furthermore, the positive and significant coefficient of the interaction variable indicates that regulatory agencies have a stronger impact on service coverage for private firms.
Finally, estimates from the model in Column (6) indicates that being a private firm operating under a regulatory agency is negatively associated to average residential tariffs. These results suggest that residential customers have benefited, through lower tariffs, from the significant improvements in labor productivity associated to privatization. Interestingly, regulatory agencies have a positive impact on public-firms average tariffs, a result that is likely to reflect improvements in cost recovery efforts and tariff rebalancing associated with the typical mandate assigned to independent regulators. Indeed one of the major changes brought about by the reforms of the 1990s is the ability of the operators to increase tariffs to recover costs. The efficiency gains achieved, however, where expected to allow the tariff increase to be lower than it would have had to be under the organization structure and costs prevailing prior to the reforms
In Table 7 we apply the difference-in-differences approach to the sample restricted to the common support. Again, results corresponding to the difference-indifferences in common support are consistent with previous results.
Overall, our empirical analysis suggests that the establishment of regulatory agencies in the developing world is associated with higher social welfare. Again, to validate our results we perform a number of robustness checks. First, the sign, magnitude, and significance of the coefficients of interest remain mostly unchanged when we drop one firm at the time or one country at the time. Second, similar results are obtained when we include country-level controls such as GDP per capita. Finally, conclusions in terms of the significance of the coefficients remain also unaltered when standard errors are clustered at country-year combinations.
Conclusions
We have presented what we believe is the first attempt at using firm-level data to evaluate the impact of introducing a regulatory agency on firm performance and social welfare. Our analysis focuses on the electricity distribution sector in the developing world, and it includes three measures of firm performance (labor productivity, operation expenditures per connection, and electricity losses) and three measures of social welfare (service coverage, frequency of interruptions, and residential tariffs).
Our empirical results indicate that regulatory agencies are strongly associated with higher labor efficiency at the firm level in the sense that less labor is used to produce a given level of output. We also find that private firms are substantially more efficient in their use of labor than state-owned firms. The estimated effects are large in economic terms. The association we identify between regulatory agencies and firm efficiency is robust. To deal with problems of omitted variable bias we control for time effects, firm effects, and a set of time-varying firm-level and country-level regressors. The association between regulatory agencies and labor efficiency remains significant in the presence of all of these variables. This is interesting because it suggests that the presence of a regulatory agency plays a separate role that is distinct from the impact of private sector participation and from an unstable or insecure environment. The effect of regulatory agencies remains significant when taking into account the problem of energy theft.
In order to check our focus on labor efficiency, we estimate an alternative productivity model using operating expenditures instead of the number of employees.
Again, we find regulatory agencies to be associated with higher firm efficiency. We also explore the impact of regulatory agencies on the electricity that is lost due to technical and non-technical reasons. We find that private firms operating under the control of a regulatory agency have lower energy losses.
Aside from firm efficiency we also explore the impact of regulatory agencies on social welfare. First, regulatory agencies are strongly associated to a decrease in the frequency of interruptions. Second, regulatory agencies have a positive impact on coverage rates, and this impact is stronger for private firms. Finally, we find a positive impact of regulatory agencies on welfare through lower tariffs, although the impact in this case is restricted to private firms.
The overall picture emerging from our empirical analysis is that the introduction of regulatory agencies in developing countries is associated with more efficient firms and with higher social welfare. In all cases we are estimating a translog form. To save space, second order terms are not shown. *Significant at the 10% level; **Significant at the 5% level; ***Significant at the 1% level. 
